Introduction
Trade protection -and the threat of it -are supposed to deter foreigners from exporting as much as they want to. The main justifications for trade restrictions are the promotion of social and commercial fairness. In the first instance, protection should reduce the adjustment costs for an industry and its workers; in the second instance, protection should secure "a level playing field" which guarantees that domestic and foreign producers can compete on equal terms. The EC, for instance claims that its antidumping policy promotes commercial fairness (de Clerq, 1988) . Voluntary export restraints, on the other hand, have been negotiated with reference to social policy arguments. The voluntary export restraint on Japanese cars to the EC, for instance, is supposed to ease adjustment for domestic firms and to reduce the negative effect of job losses in the industry (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.7.1991) .
Although the rhetoric nature of these allegations has been stressed frequently in the literature (Stegemann, 1991; Finger, 1992; Schuknecht 1992) , it is widely accepted that trade protection actually has a chilling effect on imports. This harassment effect on foreign exporters who export less in anticipation of protection has been mentioned by Bhagwati (1988 ) or Messerlin (1989a for antidumping. Winters (1990) provides evidence in this direction for EC import surveillance.
The theoretical literature on protection, however, has identified settings in which voluntary export restraints or voluntary price increases by foreign exporters are preferred to tariffs by the exporter because of the rent transfer (Hillman and Ursprung, 1988) . It is perceivable that protection, in which the foreigners obtain the benefit from the price increase, is even preferred to free trade when the foreigners can become part of a cartel where a voluntary price increase sets a floor price (Hillman, 1990) or where quantitative restrictions also have a price raising effect. Evidence in favour of such ongoings in the EC antidumping cases is provided by Messerlin (1990) and Stegemann (1990) . 
The Institutional Framework for Antidumping and Voluntary Export Restraint Protection
In the European Community protectionist requests are forwarded by EC producers who claim to be injured by imports. The speed and the degree of import penetration increase the probability that EC producers will request protection because it improves their case for being injured by imports. Domestic producers can apply for an antidumping investigation or induce the negotiation of a voluntary export restraint. Voluntary export restraints always result in quantitative restrictions which transfer part of the protectionist rent, which is the price increase, into the exporters' pockets. The most popular alternative instrument, the EC antidumping regulation, For these issues see Messerlin (1989) or Schuknecht (1992) ; for the overall importance of voluntary export restraints see also Kostecki (1987 Since lobbying by domestic and foreign firms influences the choice of instrument and determines the outcome, this is likely to be a VRA, presumably when the foreign lobby is strong and the rent domestic producers have to reinvest is small, or it may be a duty.
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As mentioned, the EC antidumping investigation involves an injury evaluation. This is based on criteria such as the change in the EC producers' market share, profits, price level, layoffs etc. Often only one of these is fulfilled. Leidy and Hoekman (1991) 
The Model
The home (EC) industry consists of n identical firms producing a good which is imperfectly substitutable to the imports of m identical foreign firms. The EC demand functions for the EC goods and the imports are: It is very subjective when a firm feels injured by imports. The EC determines whether injury is inflicted and sets the non-injurious price or quantity in its protectionist decicions.
TT P = 6 (q£ -q n ),
where 6 >0
i.e the probability T^ of protection increases with 0 ) foreign supply in t=0 (q 0 ) increasing over the exogenous non-injurious level q n .
The domestic firms may be protected via tariffs or voluntary restraint arrangements (VRAs).
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The foreign firms prefer a VRA to a duty because a VRA transfers the protectionist rent into their pockets. The rent S which the EC can distribute to the producers can be as high as the monopoly rent in this industry. We assume that the rent is exogenous, where the distribution of the rent between foreign and domestic firms depends on their market share a in t=l, (1-a) respectively. Table  l  illustrates  the  gains  from protection. In the case of a VRA, foreign firms achieve aS and the domestic firms (1-a) /3S, where 0 < (1-/3) < 1 is the fraction of the rent which is lost by the domestic firms due to the rent transfer to the foreign firms. In the case of a duty, the foreign rent is transferred to 5 The previous section showed that VRAs consist of voluntary export restraints which limit the exported quantity and price undertakings which set price floors for exporters.
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the EC budget leading to zero profits for the foreign firms while domestic firms obtain (l-a)S. The domestic and the foreign firms can influence the probability of a VRA. They therefore have an incentive to make lobbying outlays in t=0 (see also stage 2 figure l).
The probability of a VRA in t=l is assumed to be a standard Tullock lobbying function: (4) it? --^ ^ , with: L = y h-, and L = y L ;
where L and L denote foreign and domestic lobbying outlays.
We can now derive the profit function of domestic and foreign producers. The expected profits of a foreign firm j EPR Q . are: (10) 5 EPRf l\} = 0
(9) and (10) can be used to derive the equilibrium probability of a VRA in t=l: v* 1
in (7) lead to the symmetric Nash equilibria:
(1-7) 2 aS 6 7T V -Qi bB bB
(1), (2), (3), (7), (11) in (8) To identify sales below the free trade price or even dumping of foreign firms, (l), (2), (11) and (12) The equilibrium foreign price p 0 . depends negatively on the rent S, the marginal reaction of the VRA probabilty in respect to foreign lobbying L , the marginal reaction of the protection probability 0 in respect to foreign supply in period t=0 and on the market share of the foreign firms a. 7 The higher S, 6 and a, the lower the price of the foreign goods. The comparative static results are surveyed in Table 2 . The market share a of the foreign firms in t=l is not exogenous. The market share of the foreign firms in period t=l should in the case of a VRA be dependent on their quantity sold in period t=0. However, if a function a(q o ,q o ) is employed, the results with respect to p should not change qualitively. The foreign firms can increase their share of the rent S by increasing their market share a. Via an increase in their dumping in period t=0 and therefore further lower p f *. The domestic firms' instrument preference for a tariff over VRA on the other hand is not affected. So far we have assumed that the probability of protection is not affected by the domestic pricing practice. This need not be true when "spurious injury" of domestic producers is possible. 8 As mentioned, this injury raises the probability of protection which can be translated into equation (3)':
where the last term reflects the effect of spurious injury.
See Leidy and Hoekman (1991) .
If the spurious injury function (3) ' is employed instead of (3) This fits the predicted pattern of rapid initial penetration followed by moderation to prevent annoyance.
Although Winters (1990) (Winters, 1990) .
Other empirical testing is warranted. In the US, for instance, there are no genuine ad valorem antidumping duties -the exporter can always choose to charge a higher price which compensates for the duty. In such a regime, the incentive to enter the market and to gain market shares with dumping is even stronger than in the EC. In the EC, there is at least a certain probability that a duty (damaging the foreigners) will be imposed. In cases against the same product in both the US and the EC, import stimulation in anticipation of protection should therefore be even more prevalent in the US than in the EC. On the other hand, harassment should be stronger in pure tariff regimes.
